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VICIOUS ASSAILANTS, AND VICTIMS
VARIOUSLY VIGILANT
William K. Jones*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Tort litigation is often trilateral in character. Interposed between the
injurer and the victim is a sentinel charged with protecting the victim.
The sentinel is remiss and the inadequately protected victim is harmed
by a wrongdoer, one whom the sentinel should have, but did not, repel.
The victim may sue both the injurer and the sentinel, but often the
injurer is either unknown or insolvent. So the key question is whether,
and to what extent, the victim may recover from the delinquent sentinel.
In the last twenty years, the ability of an injured party to recover
from a negligent sentinel has been profoundly affected, not by any
reformulation of substantive principles applicable to trilateral
relationships, but by procedural changes principally directed at other
problems. Two cases-arising about a decade apart-illustrate the extent
of the change.
In 1974, Connie Francis, a professional entertainer, was performing
at the Westbury Music Fair in Westbury, New York.' She was staying at

* Charles Evans Hughes Professor Emeritus of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
My colleagues Alfred Hill and Victor Goldberg offered helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of
this Article.
1. See Garzilli v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1210, 1212
(E.D.N.Y. 1976).
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the local Howard Johnson's Motor Lodge. In the early morning hours of
November 8, she was attacked and raped.! The unknown assailant gained
access to the motel room through a sliding glass door that gave the
appearance of being locked but could be opened with ease from the
outside.4 A jury found that Howard Johnson's had been negligent and
awarded Ms. Francis $2.5 million in compensatory damages.' A
judgment was entered on the verdict, the court finding ample evidence of
negligence on the part of Howard Johnson's, no evidence of contributory
negligence by Ms. Francis, and support in the record for the size of7 the
jury's award. 6 No mention was made of the obviously culpable rapist.
Another trilateral case arose twelve years later in Martin v. United
States.! In 1986, nine young children were taken on an outing to
Monterey Veterans' Memorial Park.9 The children were under the
supervision of Sal Maene, an employee of the United States.'0 As a result
of Maene's negligence, Jennifer Martin, age six, became separated from
the group." She was abducted and raped by an unknown assailant.' 2 On
suit against the United States, premised on Maene's negligence, the
Government contended that the unknown assailant was the principal
offender and that the bulk of damages claimed by Jennifer should be
apportioned to him; accordingly, the United States should bear only a
small percentage of any damages assessed. 3 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applying California law, upheld the
Government's position. 4 Any harm inflicted on Jennifer had to be
apportioned between the United States and the unknown rapist; the
United States would not be responsible for most of the damages awarded
to Jennifer. 5

2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Seeid. atl211.
6. See id. at 1211, 1213-14.
7. See id. at 1211-14.
8. 984 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1993).
9. See id. at 1034.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 1035 n.2.
13. See id. at 1038-40.
14. See id. at 1040.
15. See id. Under California law, the United States would be subject to joint and several
liability for any economic damages, which presumably would be small in the case of a minor. It
would not be liable for the rapist's share of noneconomic damages. See infra notes 92-103 and
accompanying text.
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Connie Francis and Jennifer Martin were the victims of horrendous
crimes; each was raped by an unknown assailant.1 6 Howard Johnson's
was compelled to accept full responsibility for the attack on Connie
Francis. 7 But the United States, no less negligent, was permitted to
apportion a substantial part of Jennifer's damages to an unknown
assailant from whom no recovery could be expected.'8 A major portion
of any judgment recovered by Jennifer would be a worthless claim
against a nameless rapist.
The outcome in Martin reflects the current state of the law, not only
in California, but in New York (the scene of the Connie Francis rape). 9
A growing number of other states take the same position as Martin.2
Why the dramatic change in perspective? The shift is traceable to the
adoption of new laws governing comparative fault, contribution among
joint tortfeasors, and joint and several liability. While valid in many of
their applications, the cumulative impact of these changes produces
results in trilateral cases that are both unjust to victims and contrary to
the social policies properly applicable to the law of torts.
Part II of this Article examines the procedural reforms and their
justifications. Part III considers the problems posed in seeking to invoke
comparative fault in the context of intentional torts. In Part IV, we return
to the problem of negligent sentinels and predatory attacks on innocent
victims; in Part V, the problem is examined from the perspective of
malefactors who inflict injury negligently as a consequence of
inadequate protection by sentinels. This leads to closer scrutiny in Part
VI of the various bases for imposing on sentinels a "duty to protect."
Part VII considers the impact of victim fault. Concluding observations
are set forth in Part VIII, which proposes a more appropriate method for
the apportionment of damages in trilateral tort cases.

16. See Martin, 984 F.2d at 1035 n.2; Garzilli v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, Inc., 419
F. Supp. 1210, 1212 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
17. See Garzilli,419 F. Supp. at 1211, 1213-14.
18. See Martin, 984 F.2d at 1039.
19. See Siler v. 146 Montague Assocs., 652 N.Y.S.2d 315, 321 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed,
686 N.E.2d 497 (N.Y. 1997).
20. See cases cited infra note 103.
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PROCEDURAL REFORMS

A.

Comparative Fault

The case for comparative fault can best be understood by looking to
the facts of Gonzalez v. Garcia.2' Juan Gonzalez, Jack Longest and
Francisco Garcia were coworkers who participated in a carpool to and
from work.22 One morning, after leaving work at 6:00 a.m., the three of
them went on a drinking spree. Garcia was driving.2' After several stops
for alcohol, an altercation broke out and the police were summoned. 24 An
officer told Gonzalez, who appeared to be the least intoxicated, that he
should drive.25 Gonzalez did so and dropped Longest at his home.26
Garcia then insisted on driving. 27 Gonzalez attempted to call his wife to
obtain an alternate ride, but he was unable to reach her. s He then got
into the car-with Garcia driving-and fell asleep. 29 The car crashed,
injuring Gonzalez. 0 In Gonzalez's suit against Garcia, the jury found
Gonzalez to be 20% at fault and Garcia 80% at fault, reducing the
damage award to Gonzalez by 20%.'
Garcia clearly was negligent in driving while drunk. Just as clearly,
Gonzalez was guilty of contributory fault-whether characterized as
contributory negligence or as assumption of risk-in getting into a car
with an obviously intoxicated driver.32 Neither seems an attractive

21. 142 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1977). For a discussion of the history and general scope of
comparative fault, see VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 1-3 to 3-5(c)(6)
(3d ed. 1994). In about three-quarters of all jurisdictions, comparative fault is unavailable if
plaintiff's fault is either 50% or 51% of all fault. See, e.g., MARC E. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L.
RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 440 (7th ed. 2001). For ease of exposition, this limitation is
ignored in this Article.
22. See Gonzalez, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
23. See id. at 503-04.
24. See id. at 504.
25. See id.
26. See id.

27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Contributory negligence is "conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the
standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing
cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's harm."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
Assumption of risk is implied whenever "a plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm
to himself.., caused by the defendant's conduct ... nevertheless chooses to enter or remain ...
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candidate for special consideration. From a social perspective, the
optimal outcome would have been to confront Garcia with the full costs
of his drunken driving by compelling him to bear 100% of the damages
inflicted on Gonzalez. At the same time, Gonzalez should have been
required to face the full costs of his risky behavior by bearing 100% of
the costs of his injuries without recompense from Garcia. Either
Gonzalez or Garcia could have avoided 100% of the harm by behaving
properly: Garcia by not driving while drunk, and Gonzalez by not
getting into a car with a drunken driver.
But the optimal outcome is not feasible under tort law as presently
structured. Any attempt to impose 100% of the costs on Gonzalez allows
Garcia off the hook; any attempt to impose 100% of the costs on Garcia
lets Gonzalez off scot-free. The result is an odd kind of budgetary
constraint: too much money. The damages payable by Garcia have to go
somewhere; Gonzalez is the only plausible recipient under our present
system. Thus, comparative fault can be viewed as a second-best option, a
means of bringing home to both injurer and victim some substantial
share of the costs of the harm done, leaving each of them poorer than
they would have been had they behaved prudently.3 From this
perspective, lawyers and related costly aspects of the legal system serve
a useful role. They add to the costs of each party-absorbing at least part
of the undeserved surplus that otherwise would be divided between the
two parties at fault.
B. ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors
The same reasoning applies to contribution among joint tortfeasors.
Assume that Gonzalez had not fallen asleep with Garcia at the wheel,
but had continued the altercation that had led to police intervention
earlier. Garcia, impaired by alcohol and distracted by pushing and
shoving from Gonzalez, runs down a pedestrian in a crosswalk. The
pedestrian sues Garcia and Gonzalez and recovers a judgment against
both of them. If Gonzalez can be compelled to pay without contribution
from Garcia, or Garcia can be compelled to pay without contribution
from Gonzalez, then one of the parties gets off without having to
confront any of the costs of his negligent behavior. Ideally, each should
pay 100% of the injuries to the pedestrian-assuming the pedestrian
within the area of that risk, under circumstances that manifest his willingness to accept it.
Ia.§ 496C(1).
33. The point is explained more fully in the Appendix to this Article. See infra notes 235-37
and accompanying text.
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would have escaped unscathed absent misbehavior by both. But apart
from punitive damages, the tort system does not countenance recovery
by a tort victim of more than 100% of the damages incurred. As in the
case of comparative fault, there is too much money-here 200% of the
cost of plaintiff's injuries. The solution is the same: each of the joint
tortfeasors, through the mechanism of contribution, is compelled to pay
for some substantial portion of the harm inflicted35 (possibly 50% each in
this case), delivering a suboptimal message to the tortfeasors but one
that at least brings home to each party some measure of accountability
for the harm caused by his negligent behavior.
In cases of comparative fault and contribution among joint
tortfeasors, the percentage of fault ascribed to each party is not only
suboptimal. It is arbitrary. In both scenarios, Gonzalez and Garcia are
each responsible for 100% of the social harm inflicted. If either had
behaved properly, no harm would have occurred. Any reduction below
100% should be seen, not as a reward for less blameworthy behavior, but
as an inevitable consequence of the budgetary constraint under which the
tort system functions. When more than one person is jointly responsible
for the infliction of harm, the totality of damages cannot exceed 100%-even though each party, from the perspective of causation, is responsible
for 100% of the harm.
C. CurtailingJoint and Several Liability
Comparative negligence and contribution among joint tortfeasors
can be seen as rooted in the budgetary constraint of the tort system. But
the justification for eliminating joint and several liability is more
difficult to fathom.36 To return to Gonzalez and Garcia and their collision
with an innocent pedestrian, suppose that each is adjudged to be 50% at
fault but that Garcia has no assets or insurance. Why not have Gonzalez

34. See, e.g., Mark M. Hager, What's (Not!) in a Restatement? AL Issue-Dodging on
Liability Apportionment, 33 CONN. L. REv. 77, 80 n.4 (2000) (describing how the states compute
multiple defendants' contribution shares).
35. See id. at 80.
36. The threadbare justifications for abandoning joint and several liability are discussed in
Hager, supra note 34, at 94-107, which criticizes arguments advanced in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILrrY (2000), for replacing joint and several liability. See
generally Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1141 (1988) (criticizing the abandonment of joint and several liability); Aaron D.
Twerski, The Joint Torrfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response to the Critics, 22 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1125 (1989) (responding to Wright and defending several liability as opposed to
joint and several liability).
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satisfy the entire judgment, as he would have to do under joint and
several liability? 37 The most he can be obliged to pay is 100% and that is
exactly the amount he should pay absent the budget constraint
previously discussed. There is no social loss, and an accidental social
gain, in having Gonzalez answer for 100% of the damages inflicted if
Garcia is without assets.
The objections to joint and several liability have their roots in a
misperception concerning the type of harm typically inflicted by joint
tortfeasors.
Consider, first, an atypical case: a toxic dump site. Ten firms have
been dumping toxic wastes at the site over a number of years. Now the
federal government has ordered that remedial steps be taken to clean up
the site. In one sense (and generally under governing federal law), the
ten firms are joint tortfeasors: they have each contributed to a social
harm that in practical terms may be indivisible. 38 But the magnitude of
the harm clearly varies with the nature and quantity of the wastes
deposited at the site. No one firm is responsible for 100% of the harm. In
this case, it may be plausible to say that each firm should pay no more
than its proportionate share of the cleanup costs since, in a causal sense,
that is a rough approximation of the damage each has done. If one of the
ten firms had behaved properly and had refrained from depositing wastes
at the site, the evil would not have been averted. A toxic dump site still
would have had to be cleaned up. But presumably the cost of the cleanup
would have been less because the volume of toxic waste would have
been less. In short, some rational basis for divisibility may be feasible in
this kind of case-if only in terms of rough approximation. Here several
liability, rather than joint and several liability, may be the more equitable
tort objectives of deterrence and
solution and one
39 consistent with the
compensation.
But this reasoning is unavailable in cases involving rapes, assaults
and murders. In these instances, there is but one harm, not divisible by
any method grounded in reason or policy. The substitution of several
liability for joint and several liability disserves the ends of the tort
system: compensation is inappropriately circumscribed, and deterrence
of culpable behavior is blunted. This is particularly true if one of the
37. See, e.g., Hager, supranote 34, at 80.
38. See Lynda J. Oswald, New Directions in Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA?,
28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 299,312 (1995).
39. The example is suggested by RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 224 (1999). More complex
variations are discussed in Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages Among
Multiple Tonfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831 (1989).
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tortfeasors-the assailant in the Connie Francis or Jennifer Martin
case-is unknown or insolvent and predictably so.
D. Combinations and Permutations
Issues of comparative fault and contribution may arise in the same
case. To return to the misadventures of Gonzalez and Garcia, assume, as
before, that Garcia is driving under the influence of alcohol; that
Gonzalez is fighting with Garcia and impeding him in his effort to
control the car; and that the car collides with a pedestrian. But in this
instance assume that the pedestrian is not in the crosswalk; further, he is
not watching where he is going and he does not see the approaching
automobile until it is too late to avoid being hit. In short, the pedestrian
is negligent.
On these facts, a jury might assess the fault of the pedestrian at 20%
and the fault of Gonzalez and Garcia at 40% each. If the pedestrian
incurs injuries of $100,000, Gonzalez and Garcia would each be liable
for $40,000 and the pedestrian would have to bear the remaining
$20,000. This combination poses no new or distinctive problems.
But the addition of joint and several liability to the mix creates an
additional complication. Suppose, as before, that Garcia has no assets or
insurance. What adjustments are necessary? Under joint and several
liability, Garcia simply drops out of the picture and the pedestrian and
Gonzalez share the costs of the accident in proportion to their fault. 4°
Since the fault of Gonzalez (40%) is twice the fault of the pedestrian
(20%), the pedestrian would recover two-thirds of the cost of the
accident from Gonzalez ($66,667) while bearing the remainder of his
damages without recompense ($33,333).
If liability is several, rather than joint and several, the pedestrian's
recovery is limited to the original share of Gonzalez (40% or $40,000)
and he has to bear the bulk of the damages himself (60% or $60,000). 4'
In sum, the consequences of Garcia's insolvency are borne entirely by
the plaintiff, without regard to the relative fault of the plaintiff and the
remaining solvent defendant (Gonzalez). Although the impact here is
less severe than in the case in which the plaintiff is free from fault, the
use of several liability significantly distorts the outcome: most of the
costs are now borne by a plaintiff whose fault is less than the fault of any
of the other parties to the accident. As before, several liability is inferior
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILTY
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT Acr § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 135 (1991).
41.

§ C21

(2000);

See, e.g., Hager, supra note 34, at 80.
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to joint and several liability in terms of both compensation and
deterrence.
E. The Relevance of Fairness
As a matter of historical fact, the tort reforms under discussioncomparative fault, contribution among joint tortfeasors, and curtailment
of joint and several liability-were motivated more by considerations of
fairness than by concerns about the efficacy of tort law in achieving its
objectives of compensation and deterrence.'2 In the case of comparative
fault, it seemed unfair that plaintiffs, only partly at faulL, should be
barred from recovery from wayward defendants possibly much more
culpable. As regards contribution, it seemed capricious to saddle one
tortfeasor with the totality of tort liability by barring contribution from
joint tortfeasors just as culpable, allowing the latter to escape unscathed.
Finally, with respect to joint and several liability, objections were made
that tortfeasors only partly at fault were being compelled to bear more
than their "fair share" of the damages arising from the wrongful
behavior of multiple parties in cases in which other tortfeasors, jointly
responsible, turned out to be insolvent or otherwise unavailable.
On the first two issues-comparative fault and contribution-there
is no conflict between the efficient solutions discussed in Parts II.A and
II.B and solutions that might be characterized as fair. In each case,
culpable parties pay in proportion to their fault-or, in the case of
plaintiffs, forego compensation. No innocent party is compelled to
forego compensation under either comparative fault or contribution
among joint tortfeasors. Nor does any party pay (or absorb) more than its
proportionate share of fault. It is hard to imagine a norm based on
fairness that would call for a different result.
On the third issue-curtailing joint and several liability-there is a
tension between efficiency and fairness. Solvent tortfeasors argue that it
is unfair to compel them to pay more than their share of the aggregate
fault of all tortfeasors in order to compensate a plaintiff adequately in
cases in which some joint tortfeasors are insolvent, unidentifiable or
otherwise unavailable.43 The argument made in Part II.C-looking to an
efficient solution-is that as long as the accident would not have
occurred but for the negligence of the solvent tortfeasor, that tortfeasor

42. See i& at 78.
43. See, e.g., Paul Bargren, Comment, Joint and Several Liability: Protectionfor Plaintiffs,
1994 WIs. L. R . 453,468-71.
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may properly be called upon to pay up to 100% of the loss. An example
may be helpful in illuminating the underlying logic of this position.
Apex Sprinkler Service installs sprinkler systems in commercial,
residential and government buildings. Their purpose is to extinguish
fires before they can do significant damage. One such installation is
defective and the building bums to the ground with significant personal
injuries, including loss of life. Apex is sued by the owner of the building
and by other injured parties-all free from fault-and they establish
fault on the part of Apex in designing, installing, and/or maintaining the
system. Does it make any difference how the fire started? It could have
originated with natural causes, such as lightning. It could have been
started by carelessness on the part of an occupant-e.g., discarding a lit
cigarette in a wastebasket. It could have been the work of an arsonist. Or
the cause could be unknown-no natural phenomenon or act of
carelessness or arson can be shown. Obviously, if a joint tortfeasor can
be identified, Apex is entitled to contribution in proportion to fault. But
no such identification is possible if the cause of the fire was a natural
phenomenon or is simply undiscoverable. In the case of arson or
carelessness, identification also may be infeasible and, even if made,
may prove to be unhelpful to Apex under joint and several liability if the
arsonist or negligent malefactor is without assets.
The key points are that the fault of Apex is the same in all of these
cases and the damages resulting from that fault are also the same. Apex
cannot name a natural phenomenon or an unknowable cause as a joint
tortfeasor, reducing its liability to some severable part of the total.44 Its
position is no worse if the existence of a joint tortfeasor is indicated-an
arsonist or careless smoker-but that tortfeasor is either unidentifiable or
insolvent. It is difficult to identify the normative basis for holding Apex
liable for the totality of damages in some of these cases, but not in
others.
In sum, the conflict between fairness and efficiency is more
apparent than real. As argued earlier, the case for several liability rests
on a misunderstanding-i.e., that somehow Apex is responsible for less
than 100% of the damages in some but not all of the cases described
above.

44. See, e.g., id. at 458.
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mII.

COMPARATIVE FAULT AND INTENTIONAL TORTS

At common law, contributory negligence was not a defense to an
intentional tort.45 In implementing comparative fault regimes, many
modem courts have taken an analogous position: a plaintiff's
comparative fault may not be interposed to reduce a recovery against an
intentional tortfeasor. 46 But a minority of courts at common law, and a
growing minority under comparative fault statutes, have allowed a
plaintiff's comparative fault to be compared with a defendant's
intentional wrongdoing-thereby reducing the defendant's liability-in
at least some circumstances.47 The critical question is under what
circumstances is it appropriate to compare a plaintiff's negligent
behavior with a defendant's intentional malfeasance?
The heart of the problem is that the line between intentionality and
negligence is not the appropriate dividing line for purposes of
comparative fault. The category of intentional torts is overinclusive. A
narrower focus is required.
The relevant distinction is not between intentional and negligent
behavior, but between predatory and nonpredatory behavior. For this
purpose, I define "predatory" to encompass two classes of cases:
(1) instances in which the actor is seeking to appropriate for his own use
one or another interest to which the victim is entitled; and (2) cases in
which the actor derives no discernible benefit, but seeks simply to inflict
harm on the owner of the entitlement. The first class of cases
encompasses theft in all its forms (fraud, robbery, burglary, etc.), murder
for hire or gain, and rape and other forms of sexual assault. The second
category includes vandalism, murder motivated by hatred or anger, and
unprovoked assaults on the person. The two categories have these
features in common: Neither type of conduct has any redeeming social
value; society would be better off if all such behavior simply ceased.
Second, the threat posed by these practices compels persons to incur
costs, financial and personal, to avoid being victimized; to install locks
45. See, e.g., Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing
Lottery Imposed in Intentional Tort Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault,
46 VANE). L. REV. 121, 123 (1993).
46. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 460-62,
477-78 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing contributory negligence and comparative fault).
47. For discussions, see ScHwARTZ, supra note 21, §§ 5-1 to 5-2; Jake Dear & Steven E.
Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy
Considerations,24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 26 (1984); Hollister, supra note 45, at 121; William J.
McNichols, Should ComparativeResponsibilityEver Apply to Intentional Torts?, 37 OKLA. L. REV.
641, 644 (1984); Allan L. Schwartz, J.D., Annotation, Applicability of ComparativeNegligence
Principlesto Intentional Torts, 18 A.L.R. 5th 525, 538-40 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
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and bolts, to be wary about admitting strangers onto the premises, to
limit one's freedom of action so as to avoid dangerous areas at
dangerous times, and so forth.4 s
In effect, the predator imposes on other members of society costs
that are socially wasteful and would be wholly unnecessary in the
absence of predation. In many places in the past, including the East
Bronx neighborhood in which I grew up, precautions against predation
were rarely taken. Doors and windows were not locked; cars were left
open and bicycles were not chained; persons of all ages felt free to move
about at all times of the day or night without fear of being assaulted,
raped or robbed. To allow a predator to raise a defense of comparative
fault-that a door was unlocked or a bike was unchained or a woman
was out walking alone at night-is to accept as proper the unilateral
imposition of costs on society by predators as a class.
To state the issue in the most graphic terms, the predator should not
be able to say, "Your money or your life," and then, if the victim refuses
to yield, shoot him and later defend on the ground that a prudent crime
victim would have surrendered his purse when confronted with a threat
to his life.
A.

Non-PredatoryIntentional Torts

Most tortious behavior is not predatory. In the typical negligence
case, the alleged tortfeasor is engaged in a socially approved activitysuch as driving to work, constructing a building, or performing a
medical procedure. The only question in such cases is whether adequate
precautions have been taken. Injuries, when they occur, are the product
of friction between multiple parties in an interactive society, each
pursuing some socially acceptable objective. This friction can be
48. For a more detailed discussion of the problems posed by predatory conduct, see William
K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545, 551-56.
One aberrational opinion allowed a rapist to reduce the rape victim's recovery because she
had been guilty of comparative fault. See Morris v. Yogi Bear's Jellystone Park Camp Resort, 539
So. 2d 70, 77-78 (La. Ct. App. 1989). The state's leading case on comparative fault, subsequently
decided, described the Morris opinion as "[c]learly ... erroneous." Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation
Assocs., 650 So. 2d 712, 717 (La. 1994) (alteration in original). The Morris decision also was
repudiated in a subsequent statutory amendment. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West 1997).
See also Barker v. Kallash, 459 N.Y.S.2d 296, 300 (App. Div. 1983) (refusing to allow an
injured bomb maker to claim negligence on the part of the supplier of explosive materials; the
comparative negligence statute does not permit "any wrongdoer, be he a murderer, rapist or bomb
maker, to recover, at least in part, once he establishes some fault on behalf of one or more of his
partners in wrongdoing"), aff'd, 468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984). Barker is unsound. Partial recovery
should have been allowed under the reasoning associated with Gonzalez v. Garcia, 142 Cal. Rptr.
503 (Ct. App. 1977).
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reduced, and concomitant injuries avoided, if all parties take care-the
pedestrian as well as the motorist, the onlooker as well as the
construction crew, the patient as well as the doctor. In this context,
comparative fault can play a useful role in providing incentives for all
actors to adopt appropriate precautions.
But some cases alleging intentional misconduct also involve
instances of friction rather than predation. They, too, call for a
comparison of the fault of injurer and victim. Consider these examples:
In Sindle v. New York City Transit Authority,49 Mr. Mooney was
driving a New York City school bus transporting 65 to 70 boisterous
students. 0 They were heading home after the last day of the term.5 ' Some
of the students' high spirits were expressed in acts of vandalism: the
"breaking [of] dome lights, windows, ceiling panels and advertising
poster frames."52 The students ignored Mooney's warnings to behave,
and, after the damage had become severe, Mooney decided not to
discharge any more passengers and advised the students that he was
taking them to a nearby police station." Several students successfully
exited the bus by jumping through a window whenever the bus slowed
to turn." James Sindle, age 14, attempted a similar escape but had the
misfortune to fall under the bus and sustain severe injuries.55 His father
sued Mooney and the bus company for false imprisonment, seeking
damages for James's injuries.-6 The court ruled that defendants had a
plausible claim of justification-Mooney's effort to protect school
property.5 But even if that defense proved unavailing, Sindle's conduct
had to be considered: "[Ifthe trier of fact finds that plaintiff was falsely
imprisoned but that he acted unreasonably for his own safety ... [in
jumping or falling from the bus], recovery for the bodily injuries
subsequently sustained would be barred."5
Sindle antedates comparative fault, but the principle it articulates is
sound. Mooney was not a predator; he was simply trying to do his job. If
he misjudged, and if his conduct is subsequently found to be unjustified,
his fault should be compared with the fault of Sindle. On this
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

307 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1973).
See id. at 247.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Id. at 247-48.
Id. at 248.
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assumption, the unreasonable actions of both contributed to the bodily
injury. But comparative fault obviously would not apply if Mooney had
been a kidnapper or a terrorist, intent on extracting ransom or holding
the children as hostages, and one or more of them had been injured in
seeking to escape.
In a similar case, Comer v. Gregory," Sherman Chesnutt
maintained a private fishing pond on his property6 James Comer and
Ricky Griggs were trespassers, fishing in the Chesnutt pond at night
without permission.6' Chesnutt confronted them with a twelve-gauge
shotgun, and, after neither would give his name or tell where he was
from, Chesnutt informed them that he was "taking them to the law." 62 As
they were leaving the property, Comer made a sudden movement and
Chesnutt, believing that Comer was going for a gun, shot and injured
him.63 On Coiner's suit for assault and battery, the jury awarded him
damages of $125, despite proof of medical expenses and lost income
exceeding $9400.64 The court affirmed. 6 A Mississippi statute provided
that in actions for battery and other intentional torts, the defendant, in
addition to justification, "'may give in evidence any mitigating
circumstances to reduce the damages." '66 The court found sufficient
mitigating circumstances in Comer's trespass and in Coiner's
uncooperative and potentially threatening behavior.67
Again, Chesnutt was not a predator. He was seeking simply to
protect his property and to obtain the assistance of law enforcement
authorities. He may have been guilty of misjudging the seriousness of
Comer's threat. But the injury to Comer could have been avoided either
by better judgment on the part of Chesnutt or by a more law abiding and
cooperative attitude on the part of Comer. The jury evidently found both
to be at fault and apportioned the bulk of the blame to Comer. But the
Mississippi ruling should not be read as conferring a license on armed
vigilantes to patrol the countryside and shoot down those against whom
they have some sort of grievance.

59. 365 So. 2d 1212 (Miss. 1978).
60. See id. at 1213.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 1215.
66. Id. at 1214 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-61 (1972)).
67. See id.; accord Hall v. Coplon, 355 S.E.2d 195, 197-98 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
provocation may be considered as a mitigating circumstance where the plaintiff was an intruder into
a home and was shot by the defendant homeowner).
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In both Sindle and Comer, the defendants' actions may have been
unjustified under the law of intentional torts, but they were similar to
negligence in that each defendant sought to achieve a legitimate
objective, although a jury could have found that each had crossed the
boundary of reasonableness.6
B. IntentionalAntisocial Behaviorby Multiple Parties
Bonpua v. Fagan6 is illustrative of a very different configuration.
Salvatore Fagan was talking to his girlfriend in the parking lot behind
Cammarano's Bar in Long Branch, New Jersey. 0 He testified that
Robert Bonpua "ridiculed him" and called him a "faggot"-Fagan then
walked over to Bonpua's car, at which point Bonpua got out of his car
and began hitting Fagan.7 ' Fagan struck back with sufficient severity that
he subsequently was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to
seven years in prison.7 In this civil suit by Bonpua, the New Jersey court
ruled that Fagan was entitled to invoke comparative fault.73 If Fagan's
version were accepted by the jury, it could find that Bonpua had
committed an assault on Fagan or had failed to exercise due care for his
own safety.74
In a number of similar cases, comparative fault has been invoked to
deal with multiparty rowdiness leading to brawls and injuries in bars,
restaurants, school buses, and places of employment.7 One of the most
68. In one case, however, the defendant's response was so extreme that defendant's reliance
on comparative fault was disallowed on grounds of public policy. In Hattori v. Peairs,662 So. 2d
509 (La. Ct. App. 1995), Hattori, a Japanese exchange student, approached the Peairs household in
search of a Halloween party. See id. at 511. The homeowner, frightened by the costumed student,
shot and killed him. See id. at 512. The court refused to apportion any fault to Hattori, who may or
may not have been at fault. See id. at 516. Peairs was not a predator although he was seriously at
fault. A better outcome would have been to allow comparative fault in this case with the expectation
that any fault attributed to Hattori would be minor in comparison to the fault of Peairs.
69. 602 A.2d 287 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
70. See id. at 288.
71. See id. at 289.
72. See id. at288.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 289-90.
75. For a discussion of decisions concerned with mitigation in cases of assault and battery, see
Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 47, at 27-32. For modem cases invoking comparative fault in cases
involving fighting, see Provost v. Provost, 617 So. 2d 1267 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Kennedy v.
Parrino, 555 So. 2d 990 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Robinson v. Hardy, 505 So. 2d 767 (La. Ct. App.
1987); Brown v. Swartz Creek Mem'l Post 3720-Veterans of Foreign Wars, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 588
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Comeau v. Lucas, 455 N.Y.S.2d 871 (App. Div. 1982); Lomonte v. A&P
Food Stores, 438 N.Y.S.2d 54 (App. Term 1981); c. Fernandez v. City of New York, 645 N.Y.S.2d
1004 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that a fleeing criminal was subject to a defense of comparative fault
in suing for a shooting by a pursuing police officer).
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graphic is Jones v. Thomas.76 Willie Jones and John Thomas were
employees of the Audubon Park Commission in New Orleans. ' At the
time of the incident, Thomas was acting supervisor of a work crew.78
When he announced a break at 10:30 a.m., the crew, with the exception
of Jones, stopped work and took their break.79 Jones began yelling and
cursing at Thomas and continued to do so after James Logan, the regular
supervisor, had returned to take charge and Thomas had walked away.80
The tirade lasted for about ten minutes."s Among other things, Jones
called Thomas a "black motherfucker" and threatened to kick his "black
ass" and to kill his mother and bum down his house.' When threats were
made against his mother and family, Thomas lost control. s He punched
Jones in the face and broke his jaw. 4 On suit by Jones, the trial court
assessed Jones's damages at $10,000, found Thomas culpable for
assaulting Jones, but found Jones at fault for provoking the assault. 5
Thomas was assigned 10% of the fault and Jones's damages were
reduced by 90% to $1000.86
The appellate court agreed that the evidence justified a finding of
fault on the part of Jones, but it ruled that the trial court had abused its
discretion in finding Jones to be 90% at fault. 7 Because "the
provocation, although serious, offensive and demeaning, was verbal
only" and because "Jones made no overt acts or threatening gestures
towards Thomas," the more appropriate apportionment of damages was
50% to each party. 8
Bonpua and Jones are similar to Gonzalez v. Garcia, previously
discussed. In Bonpua, plaintiff committed the initial assault and
defendant responded with excessive force. In Jones, plaintiff initiated
76. 557 So. 2d 1015 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
77. See id. at 1016.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 1016-17.
81. See id. at 1018.
82. See id. at 1017 n.2.
83. See id. at 1017.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1016.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 1018. In general, courts are reluctant to allow mere words to constitute comparative
fault in the case of an otherwise unprovoked assault. See Baugh v. Redmond, 565 So. 2d 953, 959
(La. Ct. App. 1990); Mason v. Sportsman's Pub, 702 A.2d 1301, 1309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997); cf Babb v. Boney, 710 So. 2d 1132, 1133, 1135 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that the
victim of the assault was an otherwise uninvolved bystander).
89. See Bonpua v. Fagan, 602 A.2d 287,290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
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the incident with a verbal assault (one that might well have been
actionable as intentional infliction of emotional distress), and defendant
responded by striking the first (and only) blow. 0 In cases of this
character, neither party should get off scot-free. Apportionment of
damages among the several blameworthy parties to an antisocial brawl
serves the purpose of condemning the behavior of both and deterring
similar behavior in the future.
C. Summary
In the context of intentional torts, therefore, comparative fault is
appropriate in two kinds of cases:
(1) Where the defendant may have acted inappropriately, as in
Sindle and Comer,but was not engaged in a predatory course of conduct.
The misjudgments in such cases are no more culpable than ordinary
negligence.
(2) Where both the plaintiff and the defendant have behaved in an
antisocial manner, as in Bonpua and Jones, and the most appropriate
social response is to condemn both by apportioning damages between
the two of them.
These classes of cases have only a limited bearing on the principal
problem addressed in this Article: the responsibility of a sentinel to
protect a prospective victim against attacks by predatory tortfeasors. But
in resolving such cases, courts frequently cite the special status of
intentional torts under a regime of comparative fault, an approach
sometimes required by the governing state statute. 9' As discussed above,
and as further developed in Part VII, the critical distinction is not
between intentional and negligent acts but between predatory and
nonpredatory behavior.

90. See Jones, 557 So. 2d at 1016; see also Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. Supp. 206, 210 (S.D.
Fla.) (discussing racial epithets), appeal dismissed, 485 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1973); State Rubbish
Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 285-86 (Cal. 1952) (in bank) (involving threats of
future physical harm).
91. See, e.g., Comer v. Gregory, 365 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (Miss. 1978).
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PREDATORY ATTACKS ON INNOCENT VICTIMS

The federal court in Martin applied California law without any
analysis of that law. The leading California case is Weidenfeller v. Star
& Garter.92
Allen Weidenfeller was the victim of an "unprovoked armed assault
in the parking lot of the Star [&] Garter." 93 He sued the bar for negligent
failure to provide adequate lighting and other security measures in the
parking lot. 4 The jury found for Weidenfeller and assessed economic
damages at $122,500 and noneconomic damages at $250,000.95 It
apportioned fault 75% to the assailant, 20% to Star & Garter and 5% to
Weidenfeller (the basis for the latter finding was not stated and it played
only a marginal role in the court's decision).? California by statute
provided that responsibility for economic damages was joint and several
while responsibility for noneconomic damages was several only. 9
Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment against Star & Garter for
economic damages of $116,375 (95% of $122,500) and for
noneconomic damages of $50,000 (20% of $250,000)."8 On appeal by
Weidenfeller, the judgment was affirmed. 99
Weidenfeller contended that the statute was inapplicable in a case
such as this, where the conduct of one of the defendants-the assailantwas intentional." The court disagreed, saying that Weidenfeller's
argument would result in an "absurdity":
[A] negligent tortfeasor's obligation to pay only its proportionate share
of the noneconomic loss, here 20 percent, would become
disproportionate increasing to 95 percent solely because the only other
responsible tortfeasor acted intentionally. To penalize the negligent
tortfeasor in such circumstances not only frustrates the purpose of the
statute but violates the commonsense notion that a more culpable party
should bear the financial burden caused by its intentional act.'0 '
The court also was unpersuaded by Weidenfeller's arguments that
its conclusion would leave tort plaintiffs undercompensated and fail to
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14 (Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 15.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 15 n.3.
See id. at 15.
See id. at 18.
See id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
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deter negligent tortfeasors.'O On the latter, the court observed:
"Negligent actors remain liable for all economic damages and for
noneconomic damages in proportion to their fault. Moreover, a
legitimate purpose of the [statute] is to deter the more culpable
defendant."'0 3
The court did not consider whether there were means by which both
the negligent tortfeasor and the intentional tortfeasor could be held
accountable. More on this later.
The opposing point of view was set forth in a recent Florida case,
Merrill CrossingsAssociates v. McDonald.'O Lawrence McDonald was
shot and injured by an unknown assailant in a Wal-Mart parking lot.05
He sued Wal-Mart for failure to maintain reasonable security
measures.' He recovered a judgment that allocated 100% of the
damages to Wal-Mart and a related real estate company and nothing to
the unknown assailant.O0 A Florida statute had abolished joint and
several liability in most negligence actions, and Wal-Mart appealed on
the ground that some substantial share of the fault should have been
assessed against the unknown assailant.!05 In rejecting Wal-Mart's
position, the Florida court reasoned that:
[N]egligent tortfeasors ...should not be permitted to reduce their

liability by shifting it to another tortfeasor whose intentional criminal
conduct was a foreseeable result of their negligence.... [It] would be
irrational to allow a party who negligently fails to provide reasonable
security measures to reduce its liability because there is an intervening

102. See id. at 17.
103. Id. (emphasis omitted). Other cases following the California approach include:
Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc); Rosner v. Denim & Diamonds,
Inc., 937 P.2d 353 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Thomas v. First Interstate Bank, 930 P.2d 1002 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1996); Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280 (Colo. 2000) (en banc); Bhinder v. Sun Co.,
717 A.2d 202 (Conn. 1998), superseded by statute, CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp.
2001); Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners, 954 P.2d 644 (Haw. 1998); Roman Catholic Diocese
v. Secter, 966 S.v.2d 286 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998); Weiss v. Hodge, 567 N.W.2d 468 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997); Steele v. Kerrigan, 689 A.2d 685 (NJ. 1997); Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222 (N.J.
1991); Torres v. State, 894 P.2d 386 (N.M. 1995); Barth v. Coleman, 878 P.2d 319 (N.M. 1994);
Reichert v. Atler, 875 P.2d 379 (N.M. 1994); Morales v. County of Nassau, 724 N.E.2d 756 (N.Y.
1999); Siler v. 146 Montague Assocs., 652 N.Y.S.2d 315 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed,686 N.E.2d
497 (N.Y. 1997). Despite Morales and Siler, the issue cannot be regarded as free from doubt in New
York; the scope of review in Morales excluded important aspects of the problem.
104. 705 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1997).
105. Seeid. at561.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
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intentional tort, where the intervening intentional tort is exactly what
the security measures are supposed to protect against.' °9

Nothing was said about how the intentional tortfeasor, excluded
from liability in this action, might be held accountable if apprehended.
One point deserves emphasis. While the California and Florida
courts were interpreting different statutes, the language of the respective
statutes did not compel different results. Each court could have reached
the opposite result on the basis of the statute before it. The decisions
were driven by the courts' differing policy perspectives."
The most comprehensive consideration of all of the dimensions of
the problem appears in several opinions rendered in a Louisiana case,
Veazey v. Elmwood PlantationAssociates."' Christi Veazey was a tenant
in an apartment complex managed by Southmark."2 While in her
apartment, Ms. Veazey was attacked and raped by an unknown
assailant."3 She sued Southmark alleging numerous deficiencies in
security-such as inadequate locks and inadequate lighting of exterior

109. Id. at 562-63 (citations omitted). Other cases following the Florida approach include:
Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying Mississippi law);
Will v. United States, No. 97-35357, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16360, at *1 (9th Cir. July 14, 1998)
(applying Washington law); Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 137 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1998)
(applying Florida law), withdrawing question certified to state court in 129 F.3d 560 (1lth Cir.
1997); Cortez v. Univ. Mall Shopping Ctr., 941 F. Supp. 1096 (D. Utah 1996) (applying Utah law);
Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R., 641 N.E.2d 402, 408 (1Il. 1994) (dicta); Slager v. HWA Corp., 435
N.W.2d 349, 356-58 (Iowa 1989) (interpreting state's dram shop law); Kan. State Bank v.
Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587 (Kan. 1991); Gould v. Taco Bell, 722 P.2d 511 (Kan.
1986); M. Bruenger & Co. v. Dodge City Truck Stop, Inc., 675 P.2d 864 (Kan. 1984); McLain v.
Training & Dev. Corp., 572 A.2d 494 (Me. 1990); Flood v. Southland Corp., 616 N.E.2d 1068
(Mass. 1993); Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2001); Lewis v. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 675 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Civ. Ct. 1998) (applying Federal Employers' Liability Act);
McLean v. Kirby Co., 490 N.W.2d 229 (N.D. 1992); Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn.
1997); Welch v. Southland Corp., 952 P.2d 162 (Wash. 1998) (en banc). The RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14 (2000) adopts the position taken by Florida
and allied jurisdictions.
110. The California statute at issue in Weidenfeller applied to all actions "based upon
principles of comparative fault." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 2001), earlierversion
quoted in Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14, 15 n.3 (Ct. App. 1991). The statute
provided no guidance on how to respond to the action before the court because it never identified
which actions were "based upon principles of comparative fault." The Florida statute at issue in
Merrill Crossingsapplied to all "negligence cases" but not to any action "based upon an intentional
tort" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(4) (West 1997), quoted in Merrill Crossings Assocs. v. McDonald,
705 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. 1997). This statute would have supported a conclusion contrary to the one
reached by the court since the action, while charging a third party with an intentional tort, was
premised on defendant's alleged negligence.
111. 650 So. 2d 712 (La. 1994).
112. Seeid. at713.
113. Seeid.
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The first paragraph simply restates the conclusion reached in the
Florida case of Merrill CrossingsAssociates v. McDonald."9 The second
makes a more important point: any allocation of fault to the predator
reduces the incentive of the sentinel to properly discharge its
responsibilities.'" But the court's prediction about the "lion's share" of
the fault being apportioned to the intentional tortfeasor has not been
entirely accurate. In some cases, courts and juries have indeed allocated
90% or more of the fault to the predator.' But in others, the negligent

sentinel has been assessed a major share of responsibility-though
substantially less than 100%."
The third reason given by the Veazey court is not persuasive. To be
sure, the rapist is 100% responsible for his actions. But the assignment
of 100% of the fault to the sentinel is not precluded because the two are
different in kind. The double assessment of 100% of the fault is
precluded by the budgetary constraint on tort recoveries, not the cited
difference in kind.
In any case, on facts closely paralleling those of the Connie Francis

decision, Veazey comes to a conclusion wholly consonant with the
earlier view. A concurring opinion in Veazey makes explicit what should
have been apparent all along. The assailants in all of these cases are
in suit by minor's family against negligent companions of deceased minor). The disarray in the
Louisiana cases is attributable in part to Veazey's adoption of a case-by-case approach and in part to
different interpretations of a 1996 amendment to the governing Louisiana statute.
Another distinctive approach was adopted in Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah
1998), which held that apportioning fault to an intentional assailant was appropriate, but only if that
assailant was identified and named as a party. See id. at 1082; accord Bencivenga v. J.J.A.M.M.,
Inc., 609 A.2d 1299, 1303 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (refusing to apportion fault to unknown
assailant).
119. Compare Veazey, 650 So. 2d at 719, with Merrill Crossings Assocs. v. McDonald, 705
So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 1997).
120. See Veazey, 650 So. 2d at 719.
121. See Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners, 954 P.2d 644, 646 (Haw. 1998) (allocating
92% of fault to murderer, 5% to victim and 3% to negligent condominium complex). Allocations of
major fault to a negligent sentinel were reversed as insupportable in Pamela B. v. Hayden, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 147, 159 (CL App. 1994), vacated by 889 P.2d 539 (Cal. 1995), which had allocated 5% of
fault to a rapist and 95% of fault to a negligent landlord, and in Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 32
Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 654-55 (Ct. App. 1994), which had allocated 1% of fault to an assailant and 99%
to negligent government officers.
122. See Ortiz v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 22 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19,34 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (allocating
60% of fault to negligent landlord and 40% to rapist), aff'd, 198 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 1999);
Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 453-54 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc) (allocating 75% of
fault to negligent police and 25% to murderous assailant); Rosh v. Cave Imaging Sys., Inc., 32 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 136, 140 (Ct. App. 1994) (allocating 75% of fault to negligent security firm and 25% to
assailant); Weiss v. Hodge, 567 N.W.2d 468, 474-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (allocating 80% of fault
to negligent tavern and 20% to assailant); cf. Reichert v. Atler, 875 P.2d 379, 382 (N.M. 1994)
(approving a charge favorable to apportionment of major fault to the negligent sentinel).
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spaces-as well as misrepresentations by Southmark about prior crimes
and about the adequacy of the building's security measures."4 A jury
found for Veazey on her negligence claim and the issue was whether
some portion of Veazey's damages should have been apportioned to the
unknown rapist. 15 The trial court declined to do so and a divided
appellate court affirmed." ' All of the opinions agreed that, under
Louisiana's comparative fault statute, intentional and negligent conduct
could be compared."' But a majority of the state supreme court declined
to do so in this case:
First, . . . the scope of Southmark's duty to the plaintiff in this case

clearly encompassed the exact risk of the occurrence which caused
damage to plaintiff.... [N]egligent tortfeasors should not be allowed
to reduce their fault by the intentional fault of another that they had a
duty to prevent.
Second, Southmark, who by definition acted unreasonably under
the circumstances[,] ... should not be allowed to benefit at the

innocent plaintiff's expense by an allocation of fault to the intentional
tortfeasor ....
[Since] any rational juror will apportion the lion's share
of the fault to the intentional tortfeasor[,J ... application of
comparative fault principles in the circumstances ...[of this] case

would operate to reduce the incentive of the lessor to protect against
the same type of situation occurring again in the future.
Third ..... intentional torts are of a fundamentally different nature
than negligent torts .... [and] a true comparison of fault.., is, in many
circumstances, not possible ...."[I]n such a comparison, how can a
rapist ...not be 100% liable for his actions?" The common sense

answer [is] that intentional wrongdoing "differs from negligence not
only in degree but in kind. . .
114. See id.
115. Seeid. at714.
116. See id. at713-14.
117. See id. at 718, 721 (Hall, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 719-20 & n.l1 (citations omitted). For other applications of Louisiana law, see
McAvey v. Lee, 58 F. Supp. 2d 724, 729 (E.D. La. 1998) (refusing to apportion fault to unknown
assailants in suit against negligent motel); Pinsonneault v. Merchs. & Farmers Bank & Trust Co.,
738 So. 2d 172, 196 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to apportion fault to assailants in suit against
negligent bank); Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, 738 So. 2d 1105, 1113 (La. Ct. App.
1999) (apportioning fault to assailant in suit against negligent fraternity and school); Posecai v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 731 So. 2d 438, 445-46 (La. CL App. 1999) (refusing to apportion fault to
parking lot robbers in suit against negligent store); Wijngaarde v. Parents of Guy, 720 So. 2d 6, 12
(La. Ct. App. 1998) (apportioning fault to assailant in suit against negligent school board and its bus
company); Muse v. Dunbar, 716 So. 2d 110, 116 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (apportioning fault to assailant
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100% responsible for their predatory conduct.' But that responsibility
should be given effect, not by whittling down the victim's recovery
against the negligent sentinel, but by giving the sentinel a right of
indemnity against the predator. 24 The appropriate outcome in all of these
cases, assuming an absence of fault by the injured plaintiff, is to have the
plaintiff recover 100% of his or her losses from the negligent sentinel,
who in turn has a right to recover 100% of its losses from the guilty
assailant. No culpable party escapes unscathed. In the unlikely event that
the assailant is both identifiable and solvent, the negligent sentinel is
held harmless; but that remote contingency is an inevitable byproduct of
the budgetary constraint previously described (the plaintiff cannot
recover twice) and is wholly consistent with the tort objectives of
providing compensation for innocent victims and deterring unreasonable
behavior by wayward defendants. The negligent sentinel cannot
anticipate an identifiable and solvent predator. Its precautions will be
premised on the opposite assumption; no case has been found in which
the predator in a trilateral case has been both identifiable and solvent.
V.

SLUMBERING SENTINELS AND NEGLIGENT MALEFACTORS

Occasionally, the negligent lapse by a sentinel may lead to an
injury to the victim that is caused, not by a predatory assailant, but by a
negligent malefactor. Does this require a different approach? Several
cases suggest that it does. But the issue is not free from doubt.
Denny Gibbs was an inmate serving a five-year sentence with the
Louisiana Department of Corrections.' He was assigned by Sheriff
Goss to a municipal work program in the Town of Iota.2 6 While under
the supervision of Joel Cart, a municipal employee, Gibbs stole a
municipal work vehicle and fled.' 27 (The keys had been left in the
ignition and Gibbs had been out of Cart's sight.)' 28 In making his escape,
Gibbs sideswiped several vehicles, then ran a red light and collided with

123. See Veazey, 650 So. 2d at 721 (Watson, J., concurring).
124. See id. at 730, 736-37 (Calogero, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing). The
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY (2000) would limit the negligent

sentinel to a right of contribution, based on comparative fault, rather than a right of indemnity. See
id. §§ 14 cml. b, 22 cml. e. The Restatement's position affords undeserved protection to predators.
See discussion supraPart III.
125. See Marceaux v. Gibbs, 680 So. 2d 1189, 1190 (La. Ct. App. 1996), amended by 699

So. 2d 1065 (La. 1997).
126. See id.
127. Seeid. at 1191.
128. See id.
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a car in which Keith Marceaux was a passenger. 29 Marceaux was injured
and sued Gibbs, Sheriff Goss, the Town of Iota, and the town's Chief of
Police.' t' The trial court allocated fault to Gibbs (30%), Sheriff Goss
(5%) and the town (65%).' 31 An intermediate appellate court held that the
sheriff was immune from suit under a32special statute, and it apportioned
100% of the fault to the Town of Iota.
Custodians of prisoners have a duty to manage the affairs of the
prison so as not to create an unreasonable risk of harm to the
public....
Because plaintiff's injuries were sustained while defendant Gibbs
was still in the process of fleeing .... [and] plaintiff was not at
fault.., the liability of the [custodial] tortfeasor should be 100%, with
the answerable custodian ... able to seek whatever remedies the law
permits against Gibbs.133
On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, finding its
decision in Veazey to be inapplicable to the facts of this case because
Gibbs was a negligent malefactor, not an intentional tortfeasor.'M
Further, the trial court's allocation of fault was revised to apportion 70%
to Gibbs and 30% to the town.'35
The decision is puzzling. If Gibbs had shot a civilian in the course
of his escape, Veazey clearly would have supported the intermediate
appellate court's assessment of 100% of the fault to the town. If a fleeing
felon runs down a civilian rather than shooting him, what possible
difference can it make to any factor pertinent to resolving the issue of
liability? The town's negligence is the same in either case; the likelihood
of harm to innocent persons is the same; and the injury to the plaintiff
may be as great in one case as in the other. The fleeing felon is just as
dangerous in the driving case as in the shooting case (perhaps more so);
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1190.
131. See id. at 1191.
132. See id. at 1192-93.
133. Id. at 1192.
134. See Marceaux, 699 So. 2d at 1071.
135. See id.; see also McCart v. Muir, 641 P.2d 384 (Kan. 1982). In McCart,SM, a minor, was
driving while intoxicated and crossed over the center line to collide with an oncoming car. See id. at
387. The crash killed all of the occupants of both cars (except for one who was seriously injured).
See id. WM, SM's father, was held liable for his negligent entrustment of the automobile to SM,
known to be an irresponsible driver. See id. at 388. The court approved an instruction allowing the
jury to compare the fault of SM, WM, and, if relevant, the negligence of the driver of the oncoming
car and of the passengers in both cars. See id. at 390. Assuming that the only negligent parties were
SM and WM, the instruction could significantly diminish the plaintiffs' recovery against WM.
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custodial authorities should be held accountable in both cases in order to
provide appropriate incentives to take all proper precautions.
Another disturbing opinion is McKillip v. Smitty's Super Valu,
3
Inc. 6 Betty McKillip was shopping in Smitty's grocery store when she
slipped on a piece of waxed tissue paper on the floor. 3 7 Smitty's
employees used the paper to select bakery items for customers, including
the cookies Smitty's gave to children visiting the store. 3 ' "How the
paper reached the floor, whether a person dropped the paper, and how
long the paper rested on the floor" were not known.'39 McKillip sued
Smitty's on the theory that it conducted a negligent "mode of operation,"
claiming that Smitty's neglected to adopt or follow operational
procedures that would have prevented or expeditiously detected tissue
paper on the floor, whatever the source.' The court accepted the validity
of McKillip's theory of liability; the jury found that Smitty's had been
negligent. 4 ' But the court allowed Smitty's to apportion part of the fault
to the unknown paper-dropper. 142 The jury returned a verdict in favor of
McKillip for $136,000, but found Smitty's to be only 35% at fault and
the paper-dropper 65% at fault. 143 Accordingly, McKillip's judgment was
reduced to $47,600.'44 To recover the balance, she would have to track
down the elusive paper-dropper and hope to find him financially
responsible.
McKillip argued on appeal that the whole point of the "mode of
operation" theory of liability was to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
proving that "a business had notice of a hazard if '(1) the store adopted a
method of operation which the store could reasonably have anticipated
would regularly produce dangerous conditions; and (2) the store failed to
exercise due care to prevent harm under these circumstances.", 14' The
court was not persuaded.' 46 It rejected McKillip's argument as
incompatible with the legislative determination "'that each tortfeasor be

136. 945 P.2d 372 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
137. Seeid. at373.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 373, 375.
141. Seeid. at373.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 375 (quoting JEFFERSON L. LANKFORD & DOUGLAS A. BLAzE, THE LAW OF
NEGLIGENCE INARIZONA § 9.9 (1992)).
146. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:253

' The
responsible for only his or her percentage of fault and no more."' "47
court seemed impervious to the fact that its approach to apportionment
of fault removed much of the incentive otherwise applicable to stores
like Smitty's to protect their patrons against preventable hazards.
Marceaux and McKillip are beyond the central thesis of this Article
since in each case the perpetrator of harm was someone other than a
predatory assailant. 4 But they do suggest that the issue under scrutiny is
but part of a larger problem: the dilution of the "duty to protect" through
the apportionment of fault away from the negligent sentinel to someone
else (either a predatory assailant or a negligent malefactor).
Perhaps the source of the difficulty can be found in flaws in the
duty to protect.

VI.

THE DUTY TO PROTECT

The duty to protect encompasses three types of cases (some of
which overlap): control of dangerous instrumentalities and dangerous
substances; control of dangerous persons (or of information about such
persons); and possession of some distinctive advantage in guarding
vulnerable persons against harm. 49 Some are more controversial than
others.
A.

DangerousInstrumentalitiesand Dangerous Substances

One well-recognized basis of tort liability is negligent
entrustment. 50 Owners of automobiles, firearms and other dangerous
instrumentalities are expected to keep these instrumentalities out of the
hands of immature, untrained or irresponsible individuals.' 5' Reasonable
precautions are appropriate, and no basis is apparent why the law should
not be demanding. The cost of properly securing a firearm or automobile
is part of the cost of owning that instrumentality, and no social loss
occurs if owners are compelled to internalize that cost as part of the total

147.

Id. at 376 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Natseway v. City of Tempe, 909 P.2d 441, 443

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)).
148.

The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY

(2000)

follows the

approach of Marceaux and McKillip in denying contribution when the malefactor is a negligent
tortfeasor rather than an intentional tortfeasor. See id. § 14 cmt. b. The Restatement's position
dilutes incentives properly applicable to negligent sentinels.
149. See generallyKEETON ET AL., supra note 46, at 197-203 (discussing the need to anticipate
the conduct of others and, more particularly, negligent entrustment).
150. See generallyid. (describing tort liability of negligent entrustment).
151. See EPSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115-16, 153-54; KEETON Er AL., supra note 46,
at 200, 203.
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cost of ownership. There is no difference in principle between operating
a motor vehicle carefully and taking appropriate care to prevent that
vehicle from falling into the hands of juveniles, drunks, joyriders, and
the like.
In cases of accidental harm, the most dangerous of substances is
alcohol.'52 Under the laws of many states, duties are imposed on those
engaged in the commercial distribution of alcoholic beverages not to sell

to minors or to obviously intoxicated persons.'53 Again, it is difficult to
find a principled basis for opposition. Alcohol consumption imposes
severe social costs-especially when made available to minors or to the
obviously intoxicated-and those costs should be internalized by the
business of alcohol distribution. No distortion occurs if the price of
alcoholic beverages includes the cost of policing necessary to keep
alcohol away from those who have been deemed inappropriate

recipients.
While some may debate particular aspects of this duty of care, the
principle seems sound and excessive extensions seem unlikely. In most

cases, courts and legislatures have been surprisingly tolerant of those
who fail to exercise reasonable care with respect to dangerous
instrumentalities and dangerous substances.'M
B. DangerousPersons
Dangerous persons include criminals, insane persons, and
children--obviously some but not all in each category.' States apply
varying standards in defining the responsibility of custodians in each
case. Jailors are supposed to prevent dangerous criminals from escaping;
the same holds true for custodians of the dangerously insane; and parents
152. See Sharon E. Conaway, Comment, The Continuing Searchfor Solutions to the Drinking
Driver Tragedy and the Problem of Social Host Liability, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 403, 406 (1988)
(explaining the devastating effects of alcohol-related injuries and deaths).
153. See EPSTEIN, supra note 39, at 154-55; KEErON Er AL., supra note 46, at 199.
154. On liability for leaving car keys in the ignition, thereby facilitating the theft of
automobiles and subsequent harm to innocent parties, see generally Cornelius J. Peck, An Exercise
Based Upon EmpiricalData:Liabilityfor Harm Caused by Stolen Automobiles, 1969 Wis. L. REV.
909; Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAuL L. REV. 435,440-43 (1999).
On liability for affording minors and intoxicated persons access to alcohol, thereby
facilitating automobile accidents and other injuries, see Rabin, supra, at 438-40; Conaway, supra
note 152, at 419-34.
On the problem of access to guns by children, see Andrew J. McClurg, The Public Health
Case for the Safe Storage of Firearms:Adolescent Suicides Add One More "Smoking Gun," 51
HASTINGS LJ. 953, 983-99 (2000); Rachel Shaffer, Note, Child Access PreventionLows: Keeping
Guns Out of OurChildren'sHands, 27 FoRDHAM URB. L.L 1985,2004-18 (2000).
155. See EPSTEIN, supranote 39, at 303-04; KEETON ET AL., supranote 46, at 202-03.
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who have knowledge of the dangerous propensities of particular children
are expected to maintain appropriate control.'5 6 In each case, no more
than due care is required.5 7 That standard may be high or low, affecting
the cost of maintaining jails, insane asylums, and certain households.
But this matter of degree reflects differences in social judgmentsdifferences that thus far have not imposed, or threatened to impose,
excessive burdens on custodians. Again, courts and legislatures seem
surprisingly reticent in imposing liability, especially in the case of
children who run amok and inflict harm on strangers. '
More difficult problems are presented when the focus shifts to
providing information about dangerous persons: the psychiatrist who
gains knowledge that a patient has homicidal designs on a third party;"'
or law enforcement authorities who have knowledge that a dangerous
offender is to be released into the community 60 Here there are obvious
opposing social values: the importance of confidentiality in psychiatristpatient relationships, and the impediment to rehabilitation resulting from
widespread publicity of a person's prior criminality. These conflicts
have received extensive public attention. ' 6 ' As regards tort liability, the
law does not appear to be imposing excessive burdens of care.
Oddly enough, the custodial category that is most often at issue in
tort litigation is also the least controversial. Employers are held
accountable for the actions of their employees within the scope of their
employment without regard to the care, or lack of care, of the

156. See Jeffrey L. Skaare, Note, The Development and CurrentStatus of ParentalLiabilityfor
the Torts of Minors, 76 N.D. L. REv. 89, 97 (2000).
157. See id. at 99-102.
158. See Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 COLuM. L. REV. 2195, 2207-09 (2000); Skaare,
supra note 156, at 101-02.
159. The leading case in this highly controversial area is Tarasoffv. Regents of the University
of California,551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (in bank), which imposed a duty to warn on the psychiatrist.
See id. at 340. For brief discussions, see EPSTEIN, supra note 39, at 305-06; KEETON Er AL., supra
note 46, at 203; see also Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An EmpiricalStudy of
Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 443, 443-57; D.L. Rosenhan et al., Warning Third
Parties: The Ripple Effects of Tarasoff, 24 PAc. L.J. 1165, 1169-85 (1993).
160. Compare Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 734 (Cal. 1980) (in bank)
(refusing to impose a duty to warn), with Morgan v. County of Yuba, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (Ct.
App. 1964) (imposing a duty to warn). The controversy has reached a head in recent years in
disputes about "Megan's Law," requiring authorities to notify affected members of the public about
the release of sex offenders from incarceration. See Joan Petersilia, Paroleand PrisonerReentry in
the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479, 480-85 (1999); Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime
and Democracy in Late Modem America, 25 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 1111, 1134-42 (2000).
161. See, e.g., Abril R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification
Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 885, 892 (1995) (noting that New Jersey's "Megan's Law" "ignited a
national debate over the desirability and effectiveness of community notification laws").
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employer.' And the employer's responsibility is not subject to dilution
by contemporary doctrines of apportionment of fault.'63 The parallel to
other cases under this heading occurs when the employee acts beyond
the scope of his employment and the employer is charged with negligent
hiring, training or supervision."' The considerations in these cases are
similar to those applicable to other custodial situations in which the
plaintiff alleges negligent failure to control a dangerous person.
C. ProtectingVulnerable Persons
Controversies surrounding dangerous instrumentalities, substances,
and persons are minimal or are of marginal concern for purposes of this
Article. Of greater significance are cases discussed under the present
heading which turn on the defendant's relationship with the victim,
rather than with the injurer.And most of these are instances of premises
liability, in which the injured party argues that the owner of the
premises-the landlord, motel operator, store, restaurant, bar, or parking
lot-failed adequately to protect its patrons from harms inflicted by
predatory intruders (or, possibly, by negligent malefactors).' 6 A smaller
group of cases involves parties assuming responsibility for passengers,
children or other vulnerable individuals-e.g., common carriers, day
care centers, nursing homes-where the alleged neglect may be wholly
unrelated to the condition of any premises. 66
What these cases have in common is a contractual relation, direct or
indirect, between the victims seeking protection and the allegedly
delinquent sentinels who failed to provide the protection sought. And the
unyielding reality about these cases is that victims, as a class, can obtain
only those protections for which they are prepared to pay. For example,
residents in an apartment house might prefer the security of controlled
access-e.g., a doorman to screen persons seeking entry to the building.
But someone has to pay for the doorman, and that someone will be the
tenant. A central unspoken issue in all of these cases is whether the
plaintiff-victim is being shortchanged. Has she obtained all of the
security for which she has paid, or is she now demanding security

162.
163.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 13 (2000).
164. See, e.g., RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958).

165. For a good discussion of premises liability, see EPSTEiN, supra note 39, at 295-300. Most
of the cases discussed in this Article entail premises liability.
166. That was the duty at issue in Martin v. United States, 984 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1993),
discussed supranotes 8-20 and accompanying text.
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beyond the bounds of the price she was paying prior to the harmful
encounter?
Similarly, the patron of a store or restaurant may complain, after the
event, that an injury could have been avoided had specified security
measures been in effect at the time. But presumably those measures are
not costless, and their adoption would entail expenditures that would
have to be included in the prices charged for goods or meals. The same
analysis holds true for common carriers, day care centers, nursing homes
and the like.
Nor is an elevation in price the only danger. If courts are
overzealous in imposing stringent duties to protect, the supply of stores
and other accommodations may be adversely affected. The need for
security is greatest in high-crime areas. Is it in the interest of anyone to
so heighten security requirements as to make it economically infeasible
to operate an apartment building, store, restaurant, or other establishment
in a high-crime area?
This is not to say that imposing a duty to protect is never warranted.
Three kinds of cases seem relatively easy.
First, communities adopt minimum standards intended to protect
the safety of tenants, patrons and other users of facilities. These
standards reflect a public judgment that gains in safety outweigh the
adverse effects on price and availability. A court should have no
hesitation in giving effect to that judgment. If, for example, a building
code specifies that all entrance ways shall have locks of a designated
character, failure to install and maintain locks of that character is a
violation of the duty to protect.'67
Second, owners may make representations, express or implied,
about the safety of the premises. For example, municipal codes do not
normally require doormen. But if a landlord attracts tenants by
advertising a "secure" building, with 24-hour control of access, any
failure to live up to that representation violates the duty to protect.
Similarly, a door that appears to have a lock should have a lock that
works.""
Third, some practices may be so universally observed or so low in
cost in relation to the expected harm that any owner of residential or
business premises should observe them. For example, cries for help
167. This is a fairly straightforward application of the doctrine of negligence per se. See
EPSTEIN, supranote 39, at 146-53; KEFTON ET AL., supranote 46, at 220-31.
168. Representational deficiencies were at issue in two of the leading cases discussed in this
Article. See Garzilli v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1210, 1212 (E.D.N.Y.
1976); Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assocs., 650 So. 2d 712, 715 (La. 1994).
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should not go unheeded. The cost of calling for police assistance, at the
behest of a tenant or patron, is so small that the expected gain clearly
outweighs the cost. And in these cases the requisite "special relation"
exists so the proprietor cannot plausibly argue that the responsibility for
summoning assistance should be assumed by someone else.' 69
Obviously, this is not an exhaustive discussion of the topic.
Improved lighting of exterior premises may be another good candidate
for inclusion if appropriate objective standards can be devised. But this
discussion makes clear that a duty to protect is not an unmixed blessing
and that, in some cases at least, courts are justified in being circumspect
in imposing such a duty. How do these considerations bear on the
problem addressed in this Article?
First, at least on some occasions, courts seem reluctant to apportion
major fault to the premises-owner because of doubts about the propriety
of imposing a duty on the owner in the first place. Apportioning a major
share of fault to the intruder, thereby reducing the liability of the
negligent owner, is a roundabout-and thoroughly unprincipled-means
of ameliorating the impact of a duty about which some courts are
dubious.'
Second, in one class of cases, the nature and extent of the
defendant's duty cannot be avoided. When the victim is alleged to be at
fault, the court must compare the victim's alleged fault with violations
of duty on the part of the premises owner.
VII. VICTIM FAULT
As previously indicated, the victim's comparative fault is irrelevant
to any claim she might have against a predator-a rapist, robber or other
assailant. The basis for disallowing the defense is developed in Part III.
But when the victim sues the sentinel for failure to protect, her suit
is grounded in negligence and comparative fault comes into play. To
provide a simple illustration, one common ground of complaint against
169. See EPSTEIN, supranote 39, at 295-96; KEETON ET AL., supranote 46, at 201-03.

170. For a notable example, see the opinion in Pamela B. v. Hayden, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 147,
158-59 (Ct. App. 1994), vacated by 889 P.2d 539 (Cal. 1995). The "duty to protect" also has been
circumvented by imposing on the victim the almost insurmountable burden of proving that
admittedly inadequate security measures would have prevented the attack at issue. See Saelzler v.
Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1149-53 (Cal. 2001). In Saelzler, the plaintiff was raped while
making a delivery on the premises. The landlord conceded, arguendo, that its security measures for
excluding outsiders were inadequate; but the court ruled that the plaintiff was unable to show that
adequate security measures would have excluded the rapists (e.g., they could have been visitors of
other tenants or otherwise on the premises for reasons that would not have justified their exclusion).
See id. at 1145, 1147.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:253

the owners of premises is failure to provide secure locks on doors and
windows.' If, as a consequence of a faulty lock, a predator gains entry
into the victim's room, the premises-owner almost certainly will be held
to be negligent. This was the basis for liability in the Connie Francis
case discussed at the outset. 72 But suppose that the locks are adequate
and the occupant of the room or apartment simply fails to use them.
This, too, is viewed as negligent behavior and constitutes comparative
fault on which the premises-owner can rely if the victim points to other
breaches of security on the part of the owner.173
From the vantage point of both the victim and the premises-owner,
the predator is an alien force against which both parties have to take
precautions. To be sure, the predator unilaterally imposes costs upon
both, and limits the freedom of action of both. That is the basis for
disallowing comparative fault in a victim's suit against the predator and
for granting the sentinel indemnity against the predator if the sentinel is
held liable to the victim on grounds of negligence.'74 To argue, as some
have, that a woman should have no duty to take reasonable measures to
avoid a rape is the same as arguing that an occupant of a motel room has
no duty to take care to avoid a fire.175 A woman who smokes in bed,
starting a fire made worse by the motel's inadequate fire protection, is
guilty of comparative fault. So is a woman who leaves her motel door
unlocked or otherwise unreasonably fails to exclude potential rapists and
robbers.
Although some of the cases are more complex than unlocked doors
and windows, the most controversial are not far removed.
17
Consider, for example, Malone v. Courtyard by Marriott L.P. 1
Lolita Malone and Karen Meador traveled to Blue Ash, Ohio, to attend
the Kool Jazz Festival. 77 They arrived at 11:30 p.m. and proceeded to

171. See Garzilli,419 F. Supp. at 1212.
172. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
173. See Harrison v. Hous. Res. Mgmt., Inc., 588 So. 2d 64, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (rape
victim failed to lock door); Jackson v. Post Props. Inc., 513 S.E.2d 259, 261-62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that it is a jury question as to whether rape victim properly locked windows); Ledbetter v.
Concord Gen. Corp., 665 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (La. 1996) (rape victim failed to lock door); cf. Island
City Flying Serv. v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 585 So. 2d 274, 275, 277-78 (Fla. 1991) (holding that
the failure to lock an airplane stolen by a thief from the custody of a delinquent defendant was
chargeable to the owner as comparative fault).
174. See Steven C. Minson, Note, A Duty Not to Become a Victim: Assessing the Plaintiff's
Fault in Negligent Security Actions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 611, 622-30 (2000).
175. See Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and ComparativeFault, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1416 (1999). For a contrary position, see Minson, supra note 174, at 628.
176. 659 N.E.2d 1242 (Ohio 1996).
177. See id. at 1243.
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their room at the Marriott.7 1 In the elevator, they met Vincent Gatewood
for the first time. 9 They invited him to their room for drinks.' t At 12:30
a.m., a Marriott security guard knocked at their door to inform them of
noise complaints, and shortly thereafter Gatewood left.' At 1:30 a.m.,
Gatewood reappeared and for the next two hours he and the two women
made a tour of local bars.'2 Returning to the hotel at 3:30 a.m.,
Gatewood once again joined the women in their room for drinks.'
Shortly thereafter, in a confusing sequence of events, Malone and
Meador found themselves in an altercation with Gatewood that began in4
their room, continued in the hallway, and ended in Gatewood's room.'
On one occasion, Ms. Meador found herself alone in her room free to
take whatever action she chose; she chose to assist Malone who was
being dragged into Gatewood's room."s Despite screaming by the two
women and other noise emanating from the altercation-reported to the
hotel staff by other guests-no one came to the aid of the two women. 6
Gatewood raped both of them."s
In their suit against the Marriott for failure to respond to their calls
for assistance and the calls of others who had heard the noise, the jury
ruled that Malone could not recover because she was more than 51% at
fault (which bars recovery under Ohio law), but that Meador, although
also at fault, could recover because her fault was not the cause of her
injuries.' The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the judgment adverse to
Malone and ordered a new trial to rectify the jury's contradictory verdict
in favor of Meador, a verdict said by the court to be manifestly against
the weight of the evidence:
[B]oth Malone and Meador "invited ...Gatewood to their room, had
drinks with him, went out to several bars, and upon return again
allowed him in their room.... Where were several opportunities for
[Meador] to have called either hotel security or other law enforcement
for assistance."'' 9

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1243-44.
See 1d. at 1244.
See id. at 1244-45.
See id. at 1244.
See id. at 1245-46.
See id. at 1245.
See id. at 1246.
Id. at 1249 (alterations in original) (quoting the trial judge).
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Despite the censorious tone of these comments, no one is telling
Malone and Meador how to conduct their lives. None of their actions
excused the conduct of Gatewood, who was criminally prosecuted and
who would be liable in tort if sued by Malone and Meador. He could not
raise a defense of comparative fault. But when the women seek to
recover from a nonpredatory party, the hotel, then comparative fault
comes into play. Malone and Meador cannot challenge the
reasonableness of the hotel's actions without placing in issue the
reasonableness of their own conduct. The jury could have found, and
evidently did find, that either party-the women or the hotel-could
have prevented the rapes by exercising greater care.
Another controversial ruling is Wassell v. Adams.'" Susan Wassell
was visiting her fianc6, Michael, who was stationed at the Great Lakes
Training Station near Chicago.' 9' She stayed at the Ron-Ric motel, a
small and inexpensive motel that catered to the families of sailors at the
Training Station.'" Michael had to return to the base on Sunday, and
Susan spent the night alone in the motel room. 93 At 1:00 a.m. she was
awakened by a knock at the door.' 94 She went to the door and looked
through the peephole but saw no one.' Next to the door was a pane of
clear glass; Susan did not look through it.' 9' The door had two locks and
a chain. Susan unlocked the door and opened it all the way, expecting
that Michael had come from the base.'97 But it was not Michael. 98 A
stranger was at the door. He asked for "Cindy." '99 When told that Cindy
was not there, he asked for a glass of water.2°° While Susan was fetching
the water, the stranger entered the room. (The room had a screen door as
well as a solid door, but the screen door had not been locked.)20' In the
sequence that ensued, Susan had several opportunities to escape but did
not take advantage of them.'" Too late, she fled from the room but the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989).
See id. at 850.
See id. at 850-51.
See id. at 851.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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man grabbed her and dragged her back."3 She screamed but no one
responded.'M She was raped.205
Susan sued the Adamses, owners of the motel, for negligent failure
to protect her.2°0 The precautions omitted by the Adamses were said to be
these: (1) failure to warn Susan of the proximity of the motel to a highcrime area; (2) failure to employ a security guard; and (3) failure to have
either alarms or telephones in the room.y' The jury assessed the motel's
negligence at 3% and Susan's negligence at 97% and returned a verdict
for 3% of the damages claimed by Susan.20 s The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld the verdict 2 9 There was little doubt that Susan
had been negligent in opening her door to a stranger in the middle of the
night-not necessarily a major lapse in view of Susan's being awakened
from a sound sleep with the expectation that Michael was at the door. 10
But the case against the Adamses was not particularly strong. 1 Under
the facts as stated by Susan, it is unlikely that any warning by the
Adamses would have sufficed-she was proceeding on the assumption
that it was Michael at the door. Economy motels often lack telephones,
and personal alarm systems are uncommon even in expensive motels.1
As for the security guard, the cost was placed at $50 a night.2 13 That cost
had to be spread over 14 motel rooms renting for a maximum of $36 per
night.214 Assuming a 50% occupancy rate, the security guard would add
$7 per night per room-an increase of almost 20%--an outcome
incompatible with the character of the motel as an inexpensive lodging
for the families of servicemen.
Comparing Malone and Wassell, the first featured substantial
evidence of negligence by the hotel offset by substantial evidence of
negligence by the two women. In the second case, Susan's negligence
seems slight; but evidence of negligence by the motel also was pretty
slender. In both cases, either party could have avoided the totality of the
harm by prudent conduct (or so the respective juries found). That being
the case, any allocation of fault of less than 100% is arbitrary. And for
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id. at 852.
id. at 851, 856.

208. See id. at 852.
209. See id. at 856.
210.
211.
212.

See id. at 854-55.
See id. at 855-56.
I have never encountered one in extensive travels throughout the United States.

213. See id. at 855.
214.

See id. at 851.
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reasons previously indicated, it is not possible to hold both a plaintiff
and a defendant accountable for 100% of the loss.
One further point deserves attention. Malone and Meador, and
Susan as well, had called for help.1 s Suppose that some Good Samaritan
had responded and that, in the course of his efforts to assist, he had been
injured by the rapist in question. Could he recover from the victim who
sought his aid? There are no decisions directly on point, but other cases
suggest that a person who unreasonably places himself in peril is liable
for injuries to a Good Samaritan seeking to rescue the endangered
individual. 6
In one respect, however, the opinions in Malone and Wassell are
deficient. They fail to distinguish between carelessness prior to the
attack and possible shortcomings after the attack has begun. Ordinary
standards of prudence are appropriate in evaluating such lapses as
failures to lock doors and windows, invitations to strangers to enter hotel
rooms at night, and association with persons who by word or conduct
indicate a heightened potential for danger. But greater latitude should be
afforded to rape victims-and to all victims of unprovoked attacks-to
respond to the emergency engendered by the attack as best they can. It
may not be possible to determine, in the moment of desperation, whether
the best approach is to run or scream or fight back or adopt some
combination of these measures. Judges and jurors are qualified to pass
on whether or not appropriate precautionary measures were taken prior
to the attack. They should be hesitant to substitute their judgment for
that of a victim compelled to make split-second decisions in the midst of
an attack.

215. See id.; Malone v. Courtyard by Marriott L.P., 659 N.E.2d 1242, 1245-46 (Ohio 1996).
216. See, e.g., Sears v. Morrison, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 529, 533 (Ct. App. 1999); Foster v.
LaPlante, 244 A.2d 803, 804-05 (Me. 1968); Provenzo v. Sam, 244 N.E.2d 26, 28 (N.Y. 1968);
Carney v. Buyea, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902, 907 (App. Div. 1946); Talbert v. Talbert, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212,
215 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Britt v. Mangum, 134 S.E.2d 235,239 (N.C. 1964).
Comparative fault has been invoked in a number of other rape cases involving allegedly
negligent sentinels. See, e.g., McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 353 (7th Cir. 1991) (prisoner
held to have assumed the risk of a jailhouse rape; his suit against prison authorities was rejected);
Zerangue v. Delta Towers, Ltd., 820 F.2d 130, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1987) (30% of fault attributed to
victim in her suit against hotel); Kukla v. Syfus Leasing Corp., 928 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (40% of fault attributed to victim in her suit against hotel); Cook v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
847 F. Supp. 725, 734-35 (D. Minn. 1994) (comparative fault was a jury question in a bus
passenger's suit against the bus company for rape on the bus); Harrison v. Hous. Res. Mgmt. Inc.,
588 So. 2d 64, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (25% of fault attributed to victim in her suit against
landlord); Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 665 So. 2d 1166, 1168-69 (La. 1996) (35% of fault
attributed to victim in her suit against motel).
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Victim fault also has been invoked in mitigation in numerous cases
not involving rape:
Nicholas DiVincenzo was working late." 7 He left his office
unlocked while he went across the hall to a bathroom.218 On his return, he
was attacked and seriously injured.219 On DiVincenzo's suit against his
landlord for inadequate security measures, he was found to be 25% at
fault for having left his office unlocked and unattended.' °
At 8:00 p.m. on a March evening, Daniel Hardee decided to wash
his car at a self-service car-wash unattended at the time."a He was
stabbed, beaten and robbed. m On his suit against the car-wash for
inadequate security, Hardee was held to be 68% at fault for using an
unattended car-wash at night in an area known to have criminal
activity.'m
Brian Flanagan, a cadet at the Riverside Military Academy
("RMA"), got high on Scotchgard. "4 Thereafter he was beaten by three
other cadets, who were exercising disciplinary authority delegated to
them by RMA.m Flanagan died as a consequence of the combined
effects of the Scotchgard and the beating22 6 Comparative fault was held
to be no defense in the parents' suit against RMA and the three cadets,
because they had been responsible for a deliberate beating.22l But as
regards two faculty members, who had observed but had failed to stop
the beating, Flanagan's inhalation of Scotchgard was relevant as
comparative fault in a suit against them premised on negligence. m
Blazovic and his friends got into a fight with Andrich and his
friends in the parking lot of the Plantation Restaurant & Lounge. 9
Blazovic sued for injuries sustaned.' A jury found that Andrich and his
217. See Green Cos. v. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 87-88.
221. See Hardee v. Cunningham & Smith, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. Dist. CL
App. 1996).
222. See id.
223. See id. at 1317-18.
224. See Flanagan v. Riverside Military Acad., 460 S.E.2d 824, 825-26 (Ga. CL App. 1995).
225. See id.
226. See id. at 826.
227. See id.at 827.
228. See id.
229. See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 224 (N.J. 1991).
230. See id. Comparative fault was also invoked in DeMyrick v. Guest Quarters Suite Hotels,
944 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. 111.1996), a case where a hotel guest was shot in a hallway by intruders;
Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners, 954 P.2d 644 (Haw. 1998), where a resident was shot by a
guest in her room in an apartment complex; Gould v. Taco Bell, 722 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1986), where a
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cohorts were guilty of assault, that Blazovic and his companions had
been negligent in provoking the assault, and that the Plantation had been
negligent in failing to provide adequate security in the parking lot and
for selling excessive quantities of alcohol to the Andrich contingent. 3
The court ruled that all of the parties
involved should be included in an
2
assessment of comparative fault.1
In sum, no one is compelled to endure a predatory attack. And the
predator cannot defend on the ground that the victim was careless.23 But
when a charge of negligence is levied against a delinquent sentinel, the
victim's own prudence can be called into question in assessing
comparative fault.234
VIII.

CONCLUSION

A plausible plan for apportionment of damages in trilateral casesone giving weight to the incentive and compensatory objectives of tort
law-would have these features:
(1) Predators recover from no one and are responsible for the full
extent of the victim's damages. If any portion of those damages are paid
by a sentinel found to be negligent, the sentinel has a claim in indemnity
against the predator.
(2) Innocent victims recover from predators and/or negligent
sentinels, on the basis of joint and several liability, for the full extent of
their injuries. (As noted, sentinels have a claim in indemnity against
predators.)
(3) Negligent victims recover from predators for the full extent of
their injuries. But their suits against negligent sentinels are subject to a
defense of comparative fault. In other respects, they are not limited; the
fault of the predator is not relevant in this context.
The key to a just resolution of these cases is a repudiation of the
limitations on joint and several liability. Those limitations are based on a
faulty premise in assuming that each of the multiple tortfeasors should
be accountable for no more than its "fair share" of the plaintiffs harm.
But if that harm is indivisible, and if it could have been avoided had care
restaurant patron was assaulted by other patrons following an argument; Wijngaarde v. Parentsof
Kenya Guy, 720 So. 2d 6 (La. Ct. App. 1998), where a bus passenger was assaulted by another
passenger following an argument; and Jones v. Tokhi, 535 N.W.2d 46 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), where
a restaurant patron was shot in a struggle with a gunman.
231. See Blazovic, 590 A.2d at 224.
232. See id. at 231-32.
233. See SCHWARTZ, supranote 21, § 5-2.
234. See, e.g., Malone v. Courtyard by Marriott L.P., 659 N.E.2d 1242, 1249 (Ohio 1996).
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been taken by any one of the multiple defendants, then the fair share of
each is 100%. If in some cases, multiple tortfeasors escape with a lesser
share by pursuing opportunities for contribution, the reduction is not a
product of justice or sound economic policy. It is a fortuitous byproduct
of the budget constraint applicable to all tort litigation. To elevate this
accidental dividend to an icon of justice and fairness is to turn the entire
tort system on its head.
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APPENDIX
OPTIMALITY AND THE PROBABILISTIC NATURE OF

NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY

A.

Traditional "HandFormula" Analysis

To understand why comparative fault and related contribution
doctrines lead to suboptimal outcomes, it is necessary to examine the
economic basis of negligence. Under the "Hand formula," an actor is
negligent if P x L exceeds B where:
P is the probability of an accident absent care;
L is the magnitude of expected loss; and
B is the burden or cost of precaution.25
For example, an actor is negligent if an accident is expected 10% of
the time, the ensuing loss is expected to be $1500, and the actor fails to
take precautions costing less than $150. In such event, P x L (10% x
$1500) exceeds B (less than $150). Since a rational actor can escape
liability by taking appropriate precautions, it has an incentive to do so.
But the actor has no incentive to spend more than $150 on precautions.
It gains full protection at the $150 boundary; it need do no more.
From an economic perspective, this outcome is optimal. Expending
more than $150 wastes social resources since the expected value of the
averted harm is $150. To spend less than $150 also is wasteful because it
invites a social harm that could have been averted at a cost less than the
expected value of the harm ($150).
But P x L is almost never the product of a simple multiplication of
one P by one L. In practice, P x L is a weighted average of a multiplicity
of different possible outcomes. Suppose that a motorist fails to repair a
faulty braking system. The cost of doing so is $140; the saving from not
doing so is $140. Is the economy a wise one? The faulty brake system
has these consequences:

235. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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P

L

PxL

90%

0

0

8
1
.5
.4
.1
100%

12.5
400
1000
10,000
100,000

1
4
5
40
100
150

Ninety percent of the time no accident ensues. Most of the rest of
the time, losses are modest. If the actor were to ignore the final
contingency-that in one-tenth of one percent of the accidents (.001)
losses would be $100,000-the expected P x L would be $50, far less
than the cost of precaution of $140. But that myopic view of P x L
would be shattered when the big accident did occur. Motorists and their
insurance companies would have to take notice and either accurately
assess P x L or pay for losses that could have been avoided by
precautions fully justified by the probability and magnitude of the risks
at issue.
With comparative fault in effect, a motorist might reason that the
true P x L is overstated because, in at least some cases, the injured party
also will be at fault and the adverse judgment will be reduced
accordingly. Suppose, for example, that the motorist assumes that 30%
of the time the injured party will be at fault and that, on those occasions,
comparative fault will be assessed at 50% each. If the expected loss is
$1500 and if the true P x L is $150, the actor's appraisal would look like
this:
P
90%
7
3
100%

L
0
1500
750 (50% of 1500)

PxL
0
105
22.5
127.5

Given the prevalence of negligent behavior in our society, and the
random nature of such faulty behavior, the motorist's appraisal cannot
be said to be unrealistic. The motorist now has no incentive to spend
$140 or even $130 to correct its brake system even though such an
expenditure would avert a social harm expected to be $150. But in this
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instance, the law does not correct the motorist's misperception. It ratifies
that misperception by applying comparative fault, making it more
attractive for the motorist to behave negligently rather than nonnegligently.
The same analysis holds in the case of contribution among joint
tortfeasors. Suppose the motorist assumes that 30% of the time another
tortfeasor (possibly the car manufacturer) will be found to be at fault and
that, on these occasions, the comparative fault of each will be assessed at
50%. If the expected loss is $1500 and if the true P x L is $150, the
actor's appraisal would be the same as above:
P
90%
7
3
100%

L
0
1500
750 (50% of 1500)

PxL
0
105
22.5
127.5

If the motorist assumes some probability of victim fault and some
probability of joint tortfeasor liability, the estimated appraisal of P x L
will be depressed even more. In sum, anything that leads a motorist to
perceive that it probably will not confront the full social costs of his
actions will lead to a perception of P x L that is less than the true P x L.
The misperception will provide a suboptimal incentive for the motorist
to take precautions.
The problem is even more acute in the trilateral cases that are the
subject of this Article. In these instances, the liability of the sentinel is
contingent upon the misconduct of another (the assailant). In every case,
therefore, a joint tortfeasor will be present, and one to whom a major
part of the fault will be attributed (say 60%). If liability is several, rather
than joint and several, the perception of the sentinel when the expected
loss is $1500 and the true P x L is $150 will look like this:
P
90%
10
100%

L
0
600 (40% of 1500)

PxL
0
60
60

In the case of comparative fault and contribution among joint
tortfeasors, the perceived P x L is less than the true P x L but not by an
inordinate amount. Under the assumptions made above, which appear to
be within the realm of plausibility, the reduction is from $150 to $127.50
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or a diminution of 15%. But under equally plausible assumptions, the
reduction in the trilateral case (absent joint and several liability) is 60%
(from $150 to $60). The 15% reduction might not have a major impact
on incentives. A 60% reduction is almost certain to have an adverse
effect.
B.

Critiqueof the Analysis Normally Employed in Explaining the
Efficiency Aspects ofMultiparty Fault

The foregoing analysis differs from that normally employed in
explaining the efficiency aspects of multiparty fault. Consider the
following example offered by Steven Shavell.z6 There are two
tortfeasors, A and B, and the magnitude of the accident in the event of
fault by either or both of them is $1000:
Costs of
Levels of
Care by
Care by
Injurers
Injurers
A
B
B
A
0
None None 0
0
Care None 6
8
None Care 0
8
Care Care 6

Accident
Probability

Expected
Accident
Losses

Total
Accident
Costs

8%
7%
7%
6%

80
70
70
60

80
76
78
74

The efficient solution is for both parties to take care, reducing total
accident costs to 74. Under joint and several liability (or under several
liability), each party will be motivated to take care. A knows that B can
avoid all liability by taking care and thus B will do so; if this happens, A
will have expected accident losses of 70 compared with a cost of care of
6. Similarly, B knows that A can avoid all liability by taking care and
thus A will do so; if this happens, B will have expected accident losses of
70 compared to a cost of care of 8. Thus, each will take care because
each expects the other to do so. (The same reasoning applies to
comparative fault. Instead of multiple injurers, A and B are plaintiff and
defendant.)

236. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 164-67 (1987); see also
id. at 14-17. But Shavell recognizes that the suggested outcome may be altered by a number of
contingencies. See id. at 167.
Shavell's analysis is typical of law and economics scholars. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFLAW 186-89, 204-07 (5th ed. 1998).
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The problem with this approach is that it abandons the probabilistic
nature of negligence liability. It assumes that each party knows to a
certainty what the other will do. Reality is otherwise: negligence
abounds.327 The approach taken in this Article reflects that reality and
rejects the hypothetical world of those who assume that, with everyone
behaving rationally, negligence simply ceases to exist.

237. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis?New
EmpiricalEvidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 381-87 (1999).
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